Four years of war

This month marks four years since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The war has lasted longer than the Soviet Union’s war with Nazi Germany - known as the Great Patriotic War - in 1941-45. Repeated rounds of so-called peace talks have brought an end to the war no closer, and nor do they appear likely to, for the simple reason that Russian president Vladimir Putin never backs down - on anything. 

Having launched his Special Military Operation on 24 February 2022 with the aim of overrunning Kyiv and overthrowing his Ukrainian counterpart Volodymyr Zelensky within two weeks, Putin has doggedly clung on, claiming success where none existed and sowing confusion to make failure appear as victory.

In all those long, miserable years in Ukraine, the only town of any size and symbolic significance that Russia has won and held since the early weeks of the war is Bakhmut. Its army pounded and obliterated Bakhmut for a year from mid-2022, finally claiming the destroyed city in May 2023. It has been attempting to do the same in Pokrovsk since the autumn of 2024 and has declared victory there on more than on occasion, but Ukrainian troops still cling on to the ruins in parts of the city.

The Kremlin stepped up the ferocity of its battlefield attacks last year in the hope of increasing its territorial gains and bolstering its bargaining power in negotiations with the US. Russia occupied around 1,500 square kilometres over the summer of 2025, more than double the territory it gained in the same three months a year earlier. But that land came at a devastating cost to the Russian population. 

Russian casualties have averaged around 1,000 per day for months, but in December 2025, for the first time, Russian losses on the battlefield exceeded the number of new recruits, according to the Kyiv Independent. Russia added 27,400 contract soldiers, lower than the 33,200 killed or wounded that month. 

There are other indications too, that the tide may be starting to turn against Russia. The number of recruits and casualties from its major cities, including Moscow and St Petersburg, is increasing. Until recently, the authorities avoided mobilising men from metropolitan areas, fearing that their grievances could foment protests and political opposition.

Recruitment focused instead on the distant corners of this huge country, often on men who were not ethnic Russians, whose deaths would go unnoticed by the wider population. They received sign-up bonuses amounting to tens of thousands of dollars, around three times their annual salary, with additional generous payments to their families if they died. For many, the danger money was worth the risk and few dared to complain when their sons didn’t come home.

But with the Russian army starting to run out of manpower, the Kremlin can no longer shelter large segments of the population from mobilisation. The last time it attempted a partial mobilisation, in September 2022, more than a quarter of a million young men fled the country, so that option is off the table.

Putin recently changed the law to allow conscripts to be drafted year-round and reservists to be called up. Although officially these men can serve only within Russia’s borders, chances are many of them will end up in Ukraine. The same goes for large numbers of foreign nationals from Africa, South America and elsewhere, lured to Russia by false promises of work or financial reward.

Including the astronomical cost of bonuses paid to the families of recruits, military spending made up as much as half of Russia’s state budget last year, according Germany’s foreign intelligence agency, the BND, far higher than officially declared. It’s difficult to believe that this ratio can be sustainable as pressure on the economy ramps up. 

International sanctions on Russia’s energy sector are turning the screw further, with the Russian newspaper Vedomosti reporting that oil and gas revenues to the federal budget in January were 50% down on a year ago. And India - the biggest importer of Russian oil since 2022 - is expected to slash its purchases further this year under pressure from the US. 

Russia’s sovereign wealth fund has long been used to plug spending gaps, but local media have started reporting that its coffers may be running dry. On top of this, regional government debt is at a 15-year high, and the banking sector is under pressure, with many borrowers struggling to repay loans in both the corporate and retail sectors. Economists believe that the non-military economy is close to recession and even Putin has admitted that economic growth is slowing to around 1%.

So far, Putin has been adept at finding ways and means to continue his war despite an increasingly bleak economic outlook. This year, Trump could be key to whether or not he succeeds. Expect his ‘peace’ negotiations to centre on increasingly desperate pleas for the lifting of sanctions on Russian oil and gas. 

For more on Russia’s economic woes, listen to this episode of Ukraine: the Latest (which includes a fascinating story about pigeons!)